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JUDGES ARE ABUSING THEIR AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE OBVIOUSNESS BY APPLYING KSR
WITHOUT CHANGING THE LEGAL STANDARD OF
REVIEW
Colleen Murphy *

I. INTRODUCTION
Judges decide whether patents can withstand challenges of
obviousness as a matter of law. 1 For example, consider a patent that
exists for a stool comprised of a seat with three legs. A second patent
exists for a table with four legs. A third inventor then creates a stool that
combining elements from the first two patents. It contains a seat, similar
to the first stool, but is built with four legs like the table. If the new
invention is challenged, a judge would decide as a matter of law whether
the new invention is an “obvious” combination of the prior patents.
This example illustrates the broad discretion judges retain when
deciding what is obvious as a matter of law. Part II of this Comment
describes the statutory requirements to obtain a patent and how the
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
changed this area of law. Part III discusses the lower courts’ application
of KSR in recent cases. Part IV examines problems encountered by the
lower courts in applying KSR without changing the legal standard of
review. Finally, Part V concludes that, in light of KSR, judges have too
much discretion when determining a patent’s validity.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES
The Constitution gives Congress the right to grant patent monopolies
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 2 Before such a
monopoly may be granted, however, an individual must show that his
invention is “nonobvious” in order to obtain a patent. 3 This precludes
* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank Professor Timothy Armstrong, Matt Miller, and Megan Shuba for their guidance, and her
family, Trevor Tersmette, Kevin Murphy, and Betty Murphy, for their support.
1. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This exclusive right was intended to induce inventors to
publically disclose their invention through the patent system; however, the right was not to be freely
given. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. These monopolies were only to be given to inventions and discoveries
that furthered human knowledge. Id.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
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the issuance of a patent for an invention that differs from prior
inventions in only minor ways that are obvious at the time the new
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
the subject matter pertains. 4 The Supreme Court has set forth the
framework for deciding whether an invention is obvious. 5
A. Statutory Provisions
In order to obtain a patent, Congress has provided three
requirements: 6 the invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious. 7
Under the low threshold requirement of usefulness, an invention only
needs to have some identifiable benefit. 8 The novelty requirement
prevents obtaining a patent if the invention was either known or used by
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country, before the invention by the applicant. 9 The
third requirement of nonobviousness is the focus of this Comment. If a
pending patent is obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the specific
field, meaning that it simply combines elements of prior inventions, then
the pending patent will not be issued. 10 Similarly, if an issued patent is
subsequently found to have been obvious at the time it was invented, it
can be invalidated. 11
B. Determining Obviousness
The Supreme Court held that the obviousness of an invention is a
question of law that must be determined by a judge. 12 Lower courts
created the Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation (TSM) test to guide this
determination. 13 Under the TSM test, an invention is deemed to be
obvious if there is specific language in the prior inventions to teach,
suggest, or motivate the combination of these inventions to form the new

4. Id.
5. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006).
7. Id.
8. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 744–45 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). This statute also describes the type of prior references that can be
compared to an invention in order to determine if it is obvious. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,
122 F.3d 1396, 1402–03 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
11. Id.
12. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
13. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
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invention. 14 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the TSM
approach in KSR. 15 Instead, the Court broadened the obviousness
analysis to include more rationales based on the common sense and
intuition of a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art. 16
1. Pre-KSR
In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court pronounced factual
inquiries to serve as the basis for determining whether a patent is
obvious. 17 The Court had to determine whether an invention that
combined old mechanical elements of a plow to better absorb shock
while plowing rocky soil was obvious. 18 The Court held that in making
the obviousness determination, certain underlying factual inquiries were
to be used, including the scope and content of the prior art, the
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 19 Secondary considerations, such as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others,
were also deemed relevant. 20 After these inquiries were resolved, lower
courts used the TSM test to determine obviousness as a matter of law.
Under this test, mere evidence that the prior art contained the subject
matter seeking to be patented or sought to solve the same problem was
insufficient to decide whether an invention was obvious. 21
Considering the stool example discussed supra, the prior art
references would be the two previously issued patents: the stool with a
seat and three legs and the table with four legs. Each element of the new
invention, a stool with a seat and four legs, is captured in the prior art.
Since the TSM test limits an inventor’s obviousness to the language
contained in the prior art references, the stool with four legs would only
be obvious if the previous three legged stool patent contained language
that discussed the possibility of adding a fourth leg. Additionally, if the
stool with four legs was designed to solve the same problem that the
table solved, it would not be obvious under the TSM test. For example,
the patented table might have been built with four legs to be sturdier; the
14. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
Id. at 415–20.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 988 (Fed. Cir.

2009).
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mere fact that the stool added a fourth leg to be sturdier would not be
considered obvious unless there was language in the table patent
suggesting that this solution could apply to a stool. Therefore, prior
inventions that include every element of the new invention, without
more, do not cause the new invention to be obvious under the TSM test.
2. The KSR Standard
In KSR, the Supreme Court determined that the TSM test was too
rigid. 22 In this case, KSR developed an adjustable gas pedal system in
cars that allowed the pedal to be moved forward to accommodate
persons with smaller statures. 23 Teleflex, however, had already owned a
patent for an adjustable pedal assembly. 24 It contained a fixed pivot
point where the pedal could be adjusted forward. An electronic pedal
position sensor was placed at the fixed pivot point to track the pedal
position. 25 However, there were three prior art references for Teleflex’s
patent. 26 The first reference taught an adjustable pedal assembly with a
fixed pivot point for moving the pedal forward. A second described
using an electronic sensor to detect the position of the pedal. A third
reference taught to place a position sensor on a fixed pivot. 27 After
Teleflex brought claims against KSR for patent infringement, KSR
argued that Teleflex’s patent was invalid because it would have been
obvious based on the prior art references. 28
The Federal Circuit court reversed the district court using the TSM
test to validate Teleflex’s patent. 29 The court found that there was no
specific motivation in the prior art to attach an electronic sensor to the
fixed pivot point. 30 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed
the Federal Circuit court holding that the TSM test was too rigid and
formalistic. 31
The Supreme Court added rationales to be considered when
determining obviousness. 32 The Court first upheld the factual inquiry
22. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
23. Id. at 407–13.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 415. The district court granted summary judgment to KSR and found Teleflex’s patent
invalid for obviousness. Id. at 412.
30. Id. at 422.
31. Id. at 415.
32. Id. at 415–22.
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framework provided by Graham. 33 After these factual inquiries were
resolved, the Court provided several methods of finding subject matter
obvious as a matter of law. 34 The Court found the TSM test
applicable. 35 However, the Court held that if a subject matter is not
found to be obvious after applying the TSM test, additional rationales
must be considered. 36 Such rationales included combining prior art
elements according to known methods, substituting one known element
for another, using a known technique to improve similar art in the same
way, applying a known technique to existing art that is ready for
improvement, obvious to try among a finite number of identified
solutions, and designing incentives or market forces prompting
variations. 37
In applying these additional rationales, the Supreme Court relied
heavily upon the intuition and common sense of a person with ordinary
skill in the relevant art. 38 The Court determined that the obviousness
analysis need not seek out precise teachings of the prior art, but should
instead consider inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would employ. 39 In trying to solve any given problem,
the Court determined that a person of ordinary skill has good reason to
pursue known options that are in his technical grasps. 40 And, if this
leads to success it is likely not because of innovation, but instead
ordinary skill and common sense. 41 The Court stated that when work is
available in one field, design incentives or market forces can prompt a
person of ordinary skill to implement a predictable version of an
invention based in a different field or the same one, and that should bar
patentability. 42 Further, the Court established that, in many cases, a
person of ordinary skill will be able to fit teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces of a puzzle. 43 Moreover, the Court also stated that
rigid preventative rules that deny recourse to common sense are not
consistent with case law. 44
Applying KSR, it might be obvious under common sense to design a
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 413.
Id. at 415–22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id.
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stool with a seat and four legs. Indeed, a stool and table may not be in
the same field of invention because a stool is for sitting and a table is for
eating. However, it may be within the common sense of a stool designer
to look to other inventions with legs. Thus, while the four legged stool
would not have been obvious under the TSM test, it may have been
obvious according to the KSR standards.
III. CASES APPLYING THE KSR STANDARD
The lower courts adopted the obviousness analysis provided in KSR to
include the intuition and common sense of a person with ordinary skill
in the art. 45 In Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited.
Brands, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
held that using only the TSM test to find an invention not obvious was
inconsistent with KSR. 46 Because obviousness is a legal question based
on underlying factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit provided that the
standard of review allowed them to reverse the obviousness
determination of the district court in Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp. 47
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in Hitachi
Koki Co. v. Doll, resolved the question of obviousness by finding that
the common sense of a person with a high technical background would
cause him to combine multiple prior references. 48
A. Refining the TSM Test in Ball Aerosol
In Ball Aerosol, two patents had previously been issued for candle
holders. 49 One patent described a candle holder with four legs that acted
as a stand. 50 The second patent described a removable cover on a candle
holder that could be placed underneath it as a stand. 51 Ball Aerosol
combined these elements and obtained a patent for a candle holder that
had a removable lid with four legs which could be placed under the
candle to act as a stand. 52 Ball Aerosol sued Limited Brands for patent

45. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 994 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
46. Id. at 993.
47. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2739 (2009).
48. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F.Supp. 2d 4, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2009).
49. Ball Aerosol, 555 F.3d at 988.
50. Id. at 991–92.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 987.
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infringement when it sold a similar candle holder. 53 Limited Brands
counterclaimed that Ball Aerosol’s patent was obvious and invalid. 54
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois validated Ball
Aerosol’s patent using the TSM test. 55 The district court noted that all
of the elements claimed in Ball Aerosol’s patent were encompassed in
the two prior art references. 56 However, because there was not clear and
convincing evidence of any motivation to combine the prior art
teachings, the district court found that the patent was not obvious. 57 The
court stated that the defendant simply supplied prior art containing
elements of the claims in the Ball Aerosol patent and, additionally, that
the defendant used conclusory statements instead of an explanation of
the motivation to combine the sources they had alleged. 58 It found this
use of the TSM test to be consistent with KSR because KSR stated that
the analysis of a motivation to combine should be made explicit. 59 The
district court applied KSR to uphold the TSM test to find the patent
nonobvious and granted summary judgment to Ball Aerosol. 60
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and found Ball
Aerosol’s patent invalid as obvious. 61 First, the court applied the factual
inquiries described in Graham. 62 Under the first inquiry, the prior art
was the two previously issued patents. 63 Under the second, only minor
differences existed between the two prior art references and the subject
matter because the prior art described both a removable lid and a stand
with four legs. 64 Under the third inquiry, the technology of the candle
holder was simple and easy to understand. 65 As such, the level of
ordinary skill in the art was that of an ordinary layman with average
intelligence. After these factual inquiries were resolved, the question of
obviousness was to be determined as a matter of law. 66
Using KSR, the Federal Circuit found the patent obvious. 67 It found
53. Id. at 988.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 987.
56. Id. at 988.
57. Id.
58. Id. Limited Brands argued that it was self-evident to combine the prior art references
because they sought to solve the same problem of scorching caused by the candle holder. Id.
59. Id. at 993.
60. Id. at 988.
61. Id. at 987.
62. Id. at 991–94.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 993.
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that the combination of prior art elements was a predictable variation,
grounded in common sense. 68 The Federal Circuit determined the lid
invention was obvious to try for the common purpose to minimize
scorching. 69 According to the court, the lower court erred by finding
KSR to require an explicit motivation to combine. 70 The Federal Circuit
additionally held that the lower court failed to consider the Supreme
Court’s intent to have a flexible test and to include the inferences and
creative steps that an inventor would employ. 71 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit used the common sense and intuition of a person with ordinary
skill to invalidate the patent for obviousness. 72 Summary judgment was
accordingly granted to Limited Brands. 73
B. The Level of Review in Andersen
Andersen obtained a patent for a reduced visibility insect screen. 74
The screen used a number of wires that were thinner and woven tightly
together so that the window screen was more transparent. 75 After Pella
sold a similar reduced visibility insect screen, Andersen sued Pella for
infringement. 76 Pella counterclaimed that Andersen’s patent was invalid
for obviousness. 77 Pella asserted that the patent was obvious because of
a mesh manufactured by TWP and a Japanese patent disclosing a
method of coating a screen with light absorbing black color to reduce
reflection. 78
The District Court for Minnesota first applied the Graham factual
inquiries. 79 It found that the defendants made out a prima facie showing
of obviousness under these factors. 80 The court asked, “[W]ould an
insect screen manufacturer of ordinary skill have found it obvious to use
the TWP screening material, decrease its reflectance value, bond it, and

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 994.
74. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2739 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 895.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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place it in a window frame?” and answered in the affirmative. 81 The
district court found that the heart of the claimed invention was the TWP
mesh, which had been available on the internet and was in prior use. 82
Concluding that the use of mesh was a simple act of common sense
rather than invention, 83 the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and found Andersen’s patent obvious and invalid. 84
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 85 De novo review allows the court to draw its own legal
inferences and conclusions while giving more deferential treatment to
factual findings made in the court below. 86 The court found that
Andersen failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to two
Graham factors—the differences between the prior art and the claimed
invention and the level of skill in the art. 87 However, the court found a
genuine issue as to whether a person with ordinary skill in the art,
someone who manufactures insect screens with no understanding of
optics and physics, seeking to design an insect screen with reduced
visibility would have looked to TWP mesh. 88 The Federal Circuit
agreed that both common sense and the nature of the problem to be
solved could lead an insect designer to use a mesh material that was
primarily used for a purpose other than insect screens. 89 It found a
genuine issue of material fact because the TWP website did not include
TWP material on the insect screen webpage but on a separate High
Transparency webpage. 90 It also found that TWP, a company that
manufactured insect screens, did not employ this particular mesh in any
insect screen. 91 The Federal Circuit determined that common sense
might not have made it obvious to an insect screen designer to try using
the mesh as an insect screen. Because of this genuine issue of material
fact as to obviousness, the Federal Circuit vacated the summary
judgment in favor of Pella. 92

81. Id. at 895–96.
82. Id. at 896.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 895.
85. Id. at 896. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
86. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2009).
87. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 897.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 898.
92. Id. at 901.
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C. Added Complexities in Hitachi
Hitachi submitted a patent application for a desk-top saw. 93 The saw
was capable of being tilted to the left or right to cut at various angles. 94
It also allowed a work piece to be turned in different positions on the
saw base. 95 Hitachi’s patent was rejected by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) for being obvious based on five prior
art references. 96 The first reference was recognized by Hitachi in its
patent application as Applicant’s Admitted Prior Art (AAPA).97 It was
a desktop saw that could only be tilted in one direction. 98 The second
reference was a patent issued to Ito that described a desktop saw that
could be tilted in both directions, but was connected differently to the
motor. 99 A patent issued to Johnson was a third reference that was not a
desktop saw, but claimed a multiple angle cutting apparatus that was
able to turn the work piece in different positions. 100 Langworthy owned
a patent describing a motorized surgical saw. 101 Finally, the fifth prior
art reference was a patent issued to Ambrosio that contained a motorized
blade mounted underneath the cutting surface. 102 Using KSR, the
USPTO determined that one with ordinary skill in the art would have
been capable of combining the prior art references to create the
invention described by Hitachi. 103
The district court heard expert testimony during the bench trial when
Hitachi brought suit requesting the court to reverse the USPTO’s
decision. 104 The first expert was Gary Katz, an expert in the field of
finish carpentry, who testified that Hitachi’s design met a long-felt need
among carpenters because it enabled them to tilt the saw to make cuts in
both directions without having to manipulate the work piece. 105 The
second witness, Paul Hatch, was an expert in the field of power tool
design. He testified about the prior state of the art of desktop saws, the
features of the Hitachi design, and the teachings of the prior art, and he

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9–12.
Id. at 9–10.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13–15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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concluded that no person with ordinary skill in the art would have a
reason to combine those teachings. 106 The defendant’s witness, Michael
Gililland, was also an expert in power tool design. 107 He rebutted
Hitachi’s expert testimony by explaining that a person with ordinary
skill in the art would have sufficient reason to combine the teachings of
the prior art references. 108
Reviewing the USPTO’s decision de novo, the district court followed
Graham’s factual inquiry framework. 109 The court first determined that
a person with ordinary skill in the art was either a mechanical engineer
with at least five years of experience designing power tools, or someone
with technical training and ten years of experience designing power
tools. 110 Second, the scope of the prior art was defined as references
that encompass elements analogous to the claimed inventions. 111 The
court established that the five prior art references discussed supra were
sufficiently analogous to the claims to constitute prior art because the
content of the prior art was relevant specifically in what it fairly suggests
to one of ordinary skill in the art. 112 The court found disputes among the
expert testimony as to whether the prior art described a base that allowed
the work piece to be turned in either different positions or specific
cutting angles while the saw assembly is tilted. 113 The court relied on
the defendant’s expert’s testimony to find that the prior art references
taught all of the elements in Hitachi’s claim. 114 Under the third inquiry,
the court established the differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue. 115 It stated that although no reference, alone, taught the ability
to make cuts by tilting the saw in both directions, it is not necessary for
any single reference to anticipate every element. 116
The court
established that the prior art collectively taught every element of
Hitachi’s claim, and therefore, there was little or no difference between
the prior art and the claims at issue. 117
The court next sought to determine, as a matter of law, whether it
would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–20.
Id. at 21–27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
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these references based upon the underlying factual inquiries. 118 The
court used KSR to provide that it need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, but its
analysis can consider the inferences and creative steps, or even routine
steps, that an inventor would employ. 119 Applying these principles, the
court found that at the time the saw was invented, there was a
recognized design need given the limitations of the AAPA and Ito
inventions because neither reference could tilt forty-five degrees to cut
in either direction. 120 It found that there were a finite number of
predictable solutions and that the saw assembly designs of Johnson,
Ambrosio, and Langworthy were known options within the ordinarily
skilled person’s technical grasp. 121 The court found that the evidence,
including prior art, indicated that the plaintiff’s design evolved through
exercise of ordinary skill in the natural and expected development of the
art, and while it may have solved a problem, it did so in an obvious
way. 122 Accordingly, the court concluded that Hitachi’s claim was
obvious and unpatentable. 123
IV. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR affected lower courts’ analyses
for determining whether an invention is obvious. Applying these effects
to the obviousness analysis has caused problems for the lower courts.
The problems arising from the altered obviousness analysis can be
distinguished from the claim construction area of patent law, where a
similar analysis was not considered to contain problems. A solution is
possible to improve the obviousness analysis used by the courts.
A. The Effects of KSR in the Lower Courts’ Obviousness Analysis
The lower courts have concluded that the KSR decision broadened the
analysis for finding obviousness. However, the courts have continued to
use the same legal standard of review when the decision for obviousness
is appealed.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
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1. The Shift to a Broader Obviousness Analysis
Although the lower courts were initially uncertain whether KSR
affected their analysis of obviousness, courts have properly adopted
using common sense and the intuition of a person with ordinary skill in
the art in their analysis. 124 Because the district court in Ball Aerosol
found that its analysis could remain unchanged by KSR, the court
continued to rely on an unaltered TSM test that limited it to language in
the prior art. 125 The Federal Circuit, however, found this analysis to be
the same rigid application that the Supreme Court had previously
rejected. 126 The TSM test is now a starting point, and courts have
properly applied KSR to include more rationales that consider the
circumstances in each case. 127 This requires the court to go beyond the
language of the prior art references. As illustrated in Ball Aerosol, this
enlarged standard has found patents that were valid under the TSM test
to be invalid. 128 Because patents are drafted to ultimately enable a
person with ordinary skill in the art to use the invention, the obviousness
analysis has been improved to include this person’s viewpoint in
determining whether a patentee has sufficiently contributed to the
progress of the field. 129 Lower courts have appropriately adopted the
broadened obviousness analysis.
2. The Courts Did Not Change the Legal Standard of Review
Although the procedure to analyze obviousness expanded to include
common sense, lower courts did not change the legal standard of de
novo review in the wake of KSR. 130 The legal standard of review for
obviousness is a question of law consisting of underlying factual
inquiries. 131 Obviousness is reviewed de novo at each level of appeal. 132
In Andersen, the analysis began with the Graham factual inquiries,
which are given more deferential treatment on review. 133 Therefore, the
Federal Circuit did not alter the district court’s determinations
124. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc., 555 F.3d. 984, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 993.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
130. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 413 (2007).
131. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
132. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2739 (2009); Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 16 (D.D.C. 2009).
133. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 895.
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concerning the factual inquiries. 134 However, reviewing courts are free
to set aside the legal decisions of obviousness made below. 135 The
Federal Circuit used the district court’s factual answers to make different
inferences and legal conclusions that the invention was not obvious. 136
It easily reversed the legal conclusion that a person using common sense
would not use mesh. 137 Because obviousness determinations are
questions of law, the court had the relatively unimpeded authority to
reverse. This demonstrates the level of de novo review that the
reviewing court continues to exercise after the adoption of a broader
analysis.
B. Problems Created in the Lower Courts from Applying KSR
Unlike the TSM test, the broader obviousness analysis that includes
the intuition and common sense of a person with ordinary skill in the art
is difficult to apply without changing the standard of review. Also, a
judge deciding obviousness as a matter of law probably does not possess
the background knowledge of common sense of a person with ordinary
skill in the art in each circumstance.
1. Difficulty in Applying the Adopted KSR Standard
The previous method to determine an invention’s obviousness, the
TSM test, was well-defined and objective. 138 Lower courts only had to
interpret the prior references to detect any teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine or change the invention. 139 Such teaching in the
prior art would then render obvious an invention that made that
combination or change. 140 As the district court illustrated in Ball
Aerosol, it found every element of the claimed candle holder in the prior
art. However, these documents contained no teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine the lid with the legs. 141 Therefore, Ball
Aerosol’s patent of a candle holder with a lid and legs was not
considered to be obvious under the TSM method. 142 This approach is
134. Id. at 897. The Federal Circuit used the answers to the factual inquiries from the district
court to make different inferences and found a material issue of fact.
135. Hitachi, 620 F. Supp.2d at 16.
136. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 897.
137. Id. at 900.
138. See Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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well defined to only the language in the prior references. It is also an
objective test because it limits using human intuition to interpret the
prior references. 143
Lower courts do not have the benefit of a well-defined test under the
altered obviousness analysis. The inclusion of additional rationales left
courts with the difficult task of determining how to define and apply
common sense. The Supreme Court in KSR provided no guidance on
how to apply this standard. 144 This lack of guidance resulted in arbitrary
application and inconsistent conclusions. In Andersen, the decision
hinged on whether common sense would cause a person with ordinary
skill in designing insect screens to use a TWP mesh material. 145 The
district court answered this question affirmatively because the material
had been available on the internet. 146 The Federal Circuit, however,
reversed this determination because the internet site neither categorized
the material under its insect screen information nor used the material in
its own insect screens. 147 Both courts used the concept of common
sense. This, however, illustrates that finding the level of common sense
in the field has not been well-defined and has caused inconsistent
results.
The addition of common sense and intuition of a skilled person in the
art into the obviousness analysis also caused it to be more subjective. 148
Instead of merely relying on documents, lower courts must attempt now
to analyze the reasoning of a hypothetical person in the specific art.
This requires taking the facts and circumstances of each case into
account. As illustrated in Andersen, courts were examining the mindset
of an insect screen designer. 149 The consideration of human reasoning
also leads to inconsistent results because it is difficult to read the mind
of a person with ordinary skill in the art and make conclusions based on
such a reading. 150 Lower courts have used the KSR standard to account
for human decisions that cause the obviousness analysis to be more
subjective and inconsistent.

143. Id.
144. See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
145. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2739 (2009).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 898.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 896.
150. Id. at 900.
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2. A Judge May Not Possess the Ordinary Technical Background
Because the Supreme Court changed the obviousness analysis without
changing the legal standard of review, lower court judges are confronted
with establishing and applying the level of common sense of a person
with ordinary skill in the art as a matter of law. 151 Under the TSM test,
lower court judges only had to interpret the documents to find an explicit
teaching, suggestion, or motivation. 152 KSR, however, forced judges to
put themselves in the shoes of a person with ordinary skill in the art to
decide if a combination or change in inventions was an obvious step
because of common sense. 153
An obviousness determination is based on the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art, which may be very technical and outside a judge’s
knowledge. In Hitachi, such an ordinary level of skill was either a
degree in mechanical engineering plus five years of experience
designing power tools or someone with technical training plus ten years
of experience designing power tools. 154 It is unlikely that a judge
possesses this level of experience. Determining obviousness becomes a
complex task because it is difficult to ascertain why a person made an
inventive decision without this type of technical training or
understanding. 155 Lower court judges are challenged by having to detect
and apply the level of common sense a person of ordinary skill in the art
would possess without having the required background knowledge.
Some cases are also complicated by deciding whether the
combination of multiple patents would be obvious based on the common
sense of a person with ordinary skill in the art. 156 KSR stated that it may
be common sense to fit multiple references together like pieces of a
puzzle. 157 The opinion also included the combination of prior art
references of different fields. 158 In Hitachi, the district court combined
five prior art references to find that the desktop saw was obvious as
common sense. 159 These included references ranging from similar
desktop saws to handheld and medical devices. 160 The judge decided as
151.
152.
2009).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007).
Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d. 984, 988 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 993.
Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d. 4, 18 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 21–27.
Id. at 9–12.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007).
Id.
Hitachi, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29.
Id. at 9–12.
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a matter of law that it would be obvious to an experienced power tool
designer to combine all of these references. 161 Lower courts have
applied KSR to allow judges, who do not have a technical background,
to decide that combining many prior references in various fields will
render an invention obvious.
C. Distinguishing the Obvious Analysis from Claim Construction
Claim construction is an area of patent law that construes the
description of an invention and the specification of claims, the portion of
the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights. 162
The Supreme Court determined that interpreting documents in claim
construction is a matter entirely for the court, which was consistent with
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 163 The Federal Circuit
further held that judges should rely more on intrinsic rather than
extrinsic evidence when interpreting claims. 164 The Supreme Court also
provided judges with the authority to resolve expert testimony. 165 The
Federal Circuit found that this decision placed claim construction under
its authority because it could freely reverse the decision of law on
appeal. 166 This provided uniformity in claim construction decisions.167
The determination of obviousness, however, differs from claim
construction, and judges who follow these rules in their obviousness
analysis abuse their discretion.
1. The Judges’ Role in Interpreting Documents
Claim construction provided judges with the authority to interpret
patent documents entirely as a matter of law. 168 The Seventh
Amendment provides that for suits at common law, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved. 169 The Supreme Court found that at the time the
Seventh Amendment was adopted, judges ordinarily construed written
documents, and a jury was left with the task of finding facts. 170
Therefore, judges had the responsibility of construing patent documents
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 28–29.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
Id.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90.
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 383.
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to define terms in the written claims.
The obviousness analysis under the TSM test was consistent with the
theory of claim construction that interpreting documents should be
accomplished as a matter of law. The TSM test only required the
interpretation of prior references to find a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine or alter elements of an invention. 171 This test
was similar to claim construction because claim construction also only
interpreted the patent document to determine the meanings of the terms
used. Thus, the TSM test did not infringe on the preservation of a right
to a trial by jury.
After KSR, lower courts determine whether an invention is obvious,
judges are overstepping their authority of interpreting documents as a
matter of law provided in claim construction. Instead of merely
interpreting documents to find an invention obvious, lower courts
concluded that KSR broadened the legal obviousness standard. 172 In
Andersen, judges focused on whether a skilled person would have
decided under common sense to use a mesh material for insect
screens. 173 Andersen thus analyzes reasoning, which goes beyond
interpreting documents. Because the determination of obviousness
requires more than interpreting documents, judges have overstepped
their authority provided in the area of claim construction to conclude an
invention is obvious as a matter of law.
2. Instrinsic Versus Extrinsic Evidence
The Federal Circuit determined that claim construction should rely
mainly on intrinsic evidence to interpret the meanings of terms. 174 It
found that a judge should interpret terms in the claims of a patent
document by observing how the terms are used intrinsically in the rest of
the patent document rather than relying on dictionary meanings or other
experts in the field. 175 Such extrinsic sources are too generic by
reflecting an interpretation of a term under a common usage. They do
not properly reflect the intention of the patent drafter to use terms in a
certain way in order to limit the scope of his invention. 176 The court

171. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
172. Id. at 993.
173. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2739 (2009).
174. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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held that interpreting claim terms based upon how they are used in the
patent document is more helpful in determining how the drafter intended
to define the invention. 177 Therefore, intrinsic evidence is used more in
the area of claim construction.
Unlike claim construction, however, the determination of obviousness
will require more use of extrinsic evidence. The broader obviousness
analysis requires judges to go beyond the patent document to discover
the level of common sense in the field from the viewpoint of a person
with ordinary skills. 178 This requires examining knowledge in an entire
field, not just within the patent document itself. Also, because judges do
not possess the specific technical background, they will be forced to
look beyond the patent document to learn about the technologies. The
best method to accomplish this is to use expert testimony. As illustrated
in Hitachi, the judge relied heavily on expert testimony to determine that
a desktop saw invention would have been obvious as according to the
common sense of a person with ordinary skill. 179 Hitachi thus
demonstrates the frequent need for using expert witnesses as extrinsic
evidence to provide information about common training and knowledge
within the pertinent field, which a judge does not possess. Therefore,
when determining obviousness, judges will use more extrinsic evidence
than in claim construction.
3. Resolving Expert Testimony by the District Courts
Claim construction was deemed to be a purely legal question, which
caused the Supreme Court to provide the authority for judges to resolve
both legal and factual issues. 180 The Court found that when an issue
falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical
fact, one judicial actor is better positioned to decide the issue in
question. 181 The Court held that judges, not juries, are better suited to
find the acquired meaning of patent terms, thus giving judges the
authority to make factual determinations when interpreting patent
documents. 182 These factual determinations included allowing the judge
to resolve expert testimony. 183
Although making credibility
determinations is the jury’s forte, the Supreme Court found that this

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 896.
Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 21–27 (D.D.C. 2009).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389–90.
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would rarely occur in claim construction because the testimony would
be used in an educational context. 184 The Court, consequently, provided
the authority for judges to resolve expert testimony in the area of claim
construction.
Because the question of obviousness relies on underlying factual
inquiries, judges should not be able to make any factual inquiries. As
demonstrated in Andersen, the Graham factors began the obviousness
analysis. 185 When these facts are contested by the parties, a jury is
already involved in the process of deciding obviousness. 186 Because
two judicial actors are involved, juries should retain their fact-finding
role under the Seventh Amendment of finding facts. Therefore, judges
determining obviousness should not be making any factual inquiries.
The regular use of expert testimony by both parties in a suit, unlike in
claim construction, requires judges to frequently make factual
determinations about credibility that infringe on jury rights provided by
the Seventh Amendment. Plaintiffs and defendants will probably
present expert testimony representing their respective viewpoints about
common sense in the field. This testimony will probably be skewed to
the side that they represent and will, therefore, conflict. In Hitachi, the
plaintiff and defendant both presented expert testimony with respect to
obviousness. 187 While the plaintiff provided two witnesses to prove that
the desktop saw was not obvious. The defendant presented conflicting
testimony that the desktop saw was obvious. 188 Because obviousness is
a question of law, the judge resolved the testimony. This shows that the
expert testimony was presented not only to educate a judge on how a
term was used but also to persuade the judge about each party’s
respective viewpoint of common sense in the field. However, the
Seventh Amendment provides that a jury has the traditional role of
resolving expert testimony because it has the ability to evaluate
demeanor and sense the mainsprings of human conduct. 189 Judges
resolving expert testimony that is offered to advocate for a party
infringes the Seventh Amendment and oversteps the authority provided
in claim construction.

184. Id.
185. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2739 (2009).
186. Id. at 900. The Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment granted by the district court
because it found a material issue of fact that a jury should determine. Id.
187. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15 (D.D.C. 2009).
188. Id.
189. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90.
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4. Resolving Expert Testimony by the Federal Circuit
Because interpreting patent claims was a purely legal issue, the
Federal Circuit concluded that such interpretations are subject to de novo
review on appeal. 190 The court did not detect any intent in the Supreme
Court’s opinion that claim construction involved any underlying
questions of fact but instead that it was purely a legal issue. 191 This de
novo review included any allegedly fact-based questions relating to
claim construction, including determinations about expert testimony. 192
This is appropriate because the reviewing court is able to review the
document being interpreted. Under de novo review, the Federal Circuit
is permitted to set aside the entire decision of the lower court in the area
of claim construction, including determinations about expert
testimony. 193
The determination of whether an invention is obvious is also a legal
question that is subject to de novo review, but the reviewing court would
violate the authority allowed in claim construction if it made its own
determinations about expert testimony. The broader obviousness
analysis includes factual inquiries that are given more deferential
treatment under de novo review. 194 This leaves the determination of
obviousness as both a trial court and appellate court decision on appeal.
If the Federal Circuit were allowed to set aside a lower court’s factual
determinations about expert testimony, then the appropriate deferential
treatment would not be afforded. By including the resolution of expert
testimony as a small factual determination allowed by the judge as in
claim construction, the obviousness determination would not only
infringe on jury rights but also on the required deferential treatment of
the lower court’s findings.
Another reason the Federal Circuit should not be making
determinations about expert testimony relates to the fact that it is
removed from observing the testimony. The broader obviousness
analysis heavily relies upon expert testimony to determine the ordinary
level of common sense in the field, which causes the determination to
extend beyond patent documents. 195
Instead of relying on the
documents themselves, Federal Circuit judges would be making
credibility determinations even though they did not witness the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1455–56.
Id.
Id.
Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 16 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 15.
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testimony first hand. The ability to observe expert testimony is a
substantial element in determining credibility because one can observe
human behavior and make certain inferences. Because the Federal
Circuit is removed from witnessing expert testimony, it should not be
permitted to make its own credibility determinations as a matter of law.
5. Uniformity
Because of the inclusion of the underlying circumstances in each
case, the obviousness analysis cannot be as uniform as the purely legal
matter of claim construction. Judges are permitted to make factual
findings in claim construction to provide uniformity across jurisdictions.
This is because judges are bound by stare decisis. 196 However,
obviousness relies on the facts and circumstances of each invention and
the knowledge within any given field. 197 Even if the legal standard is
uniform, the application of common sense and intuition of a person with
ordinary skill itself leads to inconsistent results. 198 As in Andersen,
judges were deciding the ability of common sense of a person with
ordinary skill. 199 Even within the same case, the judges came to
different results. 200 The reliance on expert testimony also makes it less
uniform. It is uncertain which side is more credible. Thus, uniformity is
less likely in the area of obviousness than in the area of claim
construction, so judges should be precluded from making factual
findings.
V. A SOLUTION
Obviousness should remain a legal question with underlying factual
inquiries.
However, to improve the obviousness analysis, the
determination of the level of common sense of a person with ordinary
skill in the art should be added to the underlying factual inquiries.
Because factual inquiries already exist, such an addition will not be a
burdensome transition. This shift will solve some of the problems
discussed supra and will change the outcome of some cases.

196. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
197. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d. 984, 993 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
198. Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 Fed. App’x 893, 896–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2739 (2009).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 900. The district court thought it was common sense to use TWP mesh, while the
appellate court thought that it was not. Id.
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A. Solve Problems
The inquiry into the common sense of a person with ordinary skills is
subjective, but shifting it to a factual inquiry will better define the
obviousness analysis. As a factual inquiry, judges will be provided with
a process to determine the level of common sense in the relevant fields
and not have to define it themselves. They can defer to the experts of
the fields to provide information and allow juries to make the
determination as to which expert is more reliable. Judges are provided
with a more defined approach to determining the ordinary common
sense in the field by shifting this to a factual inquiry.
The shift of determining the ordinary level of common sense in the
field to a factual inquiry also prevents judges from making this
determination without the necessary technological background and from
making their own factual finding to resolve expert testimony. Judges do
not have the technical knowledge in the field, so expert testimony is
mainly needed to determine the level of common sense a person with
ordinary skill possesses. By shifting this determination to a factual
inquiry, judges can defer to experts, which make their lack of
technological knowledge irrelevant. Moreover, by allowing juries to
make the credibility decisions, judges would not be resolving expert
testimony and infringing on the Seventh Amendment. Therefore,
shifting the determination of common sense in the field to a factual
inquiry prevents judges from making decisions without the technological
background and from resolving expert testimony.
Shifting the inquiry to a factual one also allows the Federal Circuit to
give it the appropriate weight on review and prevent removed credibility
determinations. Under de novo review, factual determinations are given
more deferential treatment. Thus, the Federal Circuit will be required to
give more weight to the trial court’s finding of common sense in the
field. Such deferential treatment will prevent the court from setting
aside credibility determinations and making their own removed findings.
Consequently, shifting the common sense determination to the factual
inquiries will also prevent the Federal Circuit from making removed
credibility determinations.
Additionally, the decisions will remain as uniform as possible because
obviousness will remain a legal question.
The uncertainty of
establishing the level of common sense will be removed from the legal
question. Judges are bound by stare decisis, so the remaining analysis
will be uniform. The final obviousness determination may remain a
matter of law to provide as much uniformity as possible in the subjective
analysis.
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B. Effects on Overall Decision
The overall outcome of the obviousness analysis will change from
shifting the common sense determination to a jury because conflicting
expert testimony would cause a material issue of fact and prevent
summary judgment. Because the level of common sense was a question
of law under obviousness, lower courts were able to determine the
obviousness question during summary judgment. The district judge in
Hitachi resolved the expert testimony and found no issues of material
fact, thereby allowing him to grant summary judgment to Doll. 201
However, as a factual inquiry, the conflicting expert testimony about
whether it would be common sense to combine the prior art references
would be a material issue of fact. This would prevent the district court
from granting summary judgment. A jury might have chosen Hitachi’s
witnesses to be more credible. By adding common sense to the factual
inquiries, the determination would prevent summary judgment and
possibly change the outcome of the case by allowing a jury to choose a
different expert witness to be more credible.
Also, the determination of common sense would not be easily
reversed on appeal because it would be given more deferential
treatment. As shown in Andersen, the Federal Circuit easily reversed
the districts court’s determination that common sense would cause an
insect screen designer to use TWP mesh. 202 On the other hand, if it
were a factual inquiry, more weight would have to be afforded to the
lower court’s findings. The Federal Circuit could not have so easily
overturned the common sense determination. This may cause appellate
courts to more readily affirm the decisions of their district courts.
Therefore, decisions of obviousness would be affected by shifting the
level of common sense decision to the jury on appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lower courts have applied the KSR decision to broaden the
determination of obviousness without changing the legal standard of
review. The inclusion of common sense in the field made the
obviousness analysis difficult to apply and more subjective. It also
created another problem for judges in making the obviousness
determination in that they do not possess the required technical
background in each pertinent art. Therefore, the broader obviousness
analysis forced judges to go beyond interpreting documents and, instead,
201. Hitachi Koki Co. v. Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2009).
202. Andersen, 300 Fed. App’x at 896–98.
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to heavily rely on expert testimony. This required judges to resolve
conflicts, which infringed on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial. Therefore, the determination of the level of common sense of a
person with ordinary skill in the art should be shifted to the underlying
factual inquiries in the obviousness analysis.
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